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TAGS:PBOR, PORG, MILI, MOPS, UNSC, LE, IS, US

SUBJECT:SOUTH LEBANON: SECRETARY'S DISCUSSIONS WITH THE
ISRAELIS

1. IN VIEW OF FAST-BREAKING DEVELOPMENTS, IN PARTICULAR
SLIGHTLY UPBEAT NOTE IN LATEST ISRAELI EXCHANGES WITH SAM
LEWIS, WE DO NOT BELIEVE SITUATION LENDS ITSELF TO
STANDARD BRIEFING PAPER AND TALKING POINTS. FOLLOWING FOR
YOUR USE IN DEVELOPING APPROACH TO ISRAELIS IS CHECKLIST
APPROACH CONTAINING SUMMARY ANALYSIS AND BASIC U.S.
OBJECTIVE UNDER EACH HEADING:

BEGIN TEXT:

2. CHECKLIST FOR TALKS WITH ISRAELIS

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(A) MOVING THE LEBANESE ARMY UNIT TO TIBNIN AND RESOLVING
OR PUTTING OFF THE HADDAD PROBLEM.

(B) THE DANGEROUS SITUATION IN BEIRUT, AND THE RISK OF A
MAJOR CONFRONTATION THERE BETWEEN THE MARONITE MILITIAS
AND THE SYRIANS. THE MARONITES MAY HAVE BEGUN SHELLINGS
OF MUSLIM WEST BEIRUT, POSSIBLY USING ISRAELI-SUPPLIED

EQUIPMENT, AND THIS COULD BRING THE PALESTINIANS INTO THE FRAY, WHO UP TO NOW HAVE REMAINED QUIESCENT.

(C)--THE U.S. POSITION IN SUPPORT OF THE LEGITIMATE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT AND ITS UNIFYING POLICIES VERSUS THE ISRAELI BELIEF THAT THE SARKIS GOVERNMENT WILL NEVER BE EFFECTIVE ENOUGH TO CONTROL THE ENTIRE COUNTRY.

(D)--THE DANGERS TO THE PEACE EFFORT; THE RISK OF ISRAELI-SYRIAN WAR.

(E)--ISRAEL'S INTERNATIONAL IMAGE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING, IN WHICH ISRAEL'S PRESENT POSITION AND ACTIONS WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO DEFEND.

3. MOVEMENT OF THE LEBANESE ARMY UNIT AND RESOLUTION OF THE HADDAD PROBLEM.

ANALYSIS: THE LEBANESE PROBABLY CAN BE PREVAILED UPON TO ACCEPT OUR SO-CALLED PRAGMATIC PROPOSAL AND PUT ASIDE THE QUESTION OF HADDAD'S FUTURE FOR THE TIME BEING, POSSIBLY WITH HELP OF MESSAGE FROM SECRETARY TO 30UTRUS ALONG LINES BEIRUT 4484. THE ISRAELI LEADERSHIP HAS A STRONG MORAL COMMITMENT TO HADDAD BUT, MORE PRACTICALLY, MAY BE AFRAID HE WILL PACK UP AND LEAVE. THEY MAY FEAR THAT THE COMMANDERS LEFT BEHIND WILL PROVIDE INADEQUATE
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LEADERSHIP, AND THE ENTIRE COLLECTION OF MILITIAS BUILT UP AND SUPPORTED BY THE ISRAELIS WILL COME APART EVENTUALLY. THERE EXISTS THE POSSIBILITY OF A PRACTICAL ISRAELI-LEBANESE UNDERSTANDING OVER HADDAD, WHEREBY HADDAD MIGHT REMAIN IN HIS ENCLAVE FOR AWHILE, ALTHOUGH THIS WOULD REQUIRE THE ISRAELIS TO ACCEPT SOME ALTERNATE LEADERSHIP EVENTUALLY.

HADDAD, HOWEVER, WHETHER ON HIS OWN OR AT INSISTENCE OF OTHERS, DEMANDING THAT HE BE REINSTATED BY THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT OR THAT THE ORDERS RELIEVING HIM OF COMMAND BE ANNULLED. THIS IS A VIRTUAL IMPOSSIBILITY FOR THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT PARTICULARLY AFTER HADDAD SHELLED THE LEBANESE ARMY UNIT.

U.S. OBJECTIVE: TO PERSUADE THE ISRAELIS THAT HADDAD MUST BE COMPELLED OR PERSUADED INTO ALLOWING THE LEBANESE ARMY UNIT TO PROCEED, SINCE DELAY COULD MEAN THE FINAL FALL OF THE SARKIS GOVERNMENT, THE UDRAVELLING OF UNIFIL, AND A SECURITY COUNCIL DEBATE IN WHICH ISRAEL'S POSITION WOULD BE FULLY EXPOSED. (WE SHOULD EXPLORE FULLY WHETHER GAZIT'S IDEA OF BY-PASSING CHRISTIAN ENCLAVES AT SOME

DISTANCE COULD BE WORKABLE. SEE PARA 9 TEL AVIV 9999.)
THE QUESTION OF HADDAD'S FUTURE STATUS COULD BE
NEGOTIATED AND RESOLVED LATER, WHEN THE LEBANESE ARMY UNIT
IS FINALLY IN TIBNIN IN CENTRAL SOUTH LEBANON.

4. A LOOMING MAJOR CONFRONTATION BETWEEN MARONITE
MILITIAS AND SYRIAN FORCES IN BEIRUT.

ANALYSIS: IN AN EXTREMELY DANGEROUS DEVELOPMENT, THE
MARONITE MILITIAS IN THEIR LATEST CHALLENGES OF THE
SYRIANS HAVE BEGUN TO SHELL MUSLIM WEST BEIRUT, WHERE
THERE ARE ALSO HEAVY PALESTINIAN CONCENTRATIONS. THE
PALESTINIANS, WHO UNTIL NOW HAVE STAYED OUT OF PAST
MARONITE-SYRIAN FIGHTING, COULD COME INTO THE FRAY; AND
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THE MARONITES, IF THE BATTLE TURNED AGAINST THEM, COULD
APPEAL TO THE ISRAELIS FOR HELP BY ARGUING THAT BOTH THE
SYRIANS AND THE PALESTINIANS WERE GOING TO BRING ABOUT A
"HOLOCAUST" OF THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY. THE ISRAELIS ARE
GENUINELY CONCERNED AND INCREASINGLY SUSPICIOUS THAT THE
SYRIANS WANT TO TAKE OVER LEBANON FOR GOOD, AND DESTROY
THE POLITICAL AS WELL AS THE MILITARY POWER OF THE
MARONITIES IN THE PROCESS.

BY PROVOKING THE SYRIANS INTO MASSIVE RETALIATORY
ACTIONS, THE MARONITE EXTREMIST LEADERS HAVE UNITED MUCH OF
THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY IN OPPOSITION TO THE SYRIAN
PRESENCE, AT LEAST SUCH A PRESENCE IN CHRISTIAN AREAS.
EQUALLY IMPORTANT, THE RESULT HAS BEEN FURTHER DISCREDITIZW**06N* ***15*T; 5***C*G*&***Y&F**DA;40E7**,***K9S
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THEIR LEBANESE LEFTIST ALLIES. THE OPPORTUNITY OFFERED
BY UNIFIL TO STABILIZE SOUTHERN LEBANON AND REDUCE THE
SECURITY THREAT TO ISRAEL WILL HAVE BEEN LOST. THE RISK
OF GENERAL WAR IN THE AREA AS WELL AS FUTURE INVASIONS
OF SOUTHERN LEBANON WILL HAVE INCREASED.

U.S. OBJECTIVE: TO CONVINCE THE ISRAELIS THAT
MARONITE COOPERATION WITH AND SUPPORT OF THE LEGITIMATE
GOVERNMENT IS THE BEST WAY OF ENSURING A REDUCTION OF
SYRIAN MILITARY PRESENCE AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE, AS WELL
AS PREVENTING LEBANON FROM BECOMING A CONFRONTATION STATE.

WE ALSO WANT TO UNDERSCORE THEME THAT OUR TWO
GOVERNMENTS CONSULT MORE CLOSELY AS TO WHAT WE WOULD LIKE
TO SEE EMERGE IN LEBANON OVER THE LONG RUN.

6. THE DANGERS TO THE PEACE EFFORT; THE RISK OF
ISRAELI-SYRIAN WAR.

ANALYSIS: AMONG OTHER SCENARIOS, THE ALL-TOO-REAL

POSSIBILITY OF A MAJOR MARONITE-SYRIAN MILITARY CON-
FRONTATION IN THE BEIRUT AREA, IF NOT CONTAINED QUICKLY,
COULD BRING ABOUT: FIRST, STERN ISRAELI WARNINGS; THEN,
ISRAELI OVERFLIGHTS AND MASSIVE MILITARY SUPPLY EFFORTS;
AND, EVENTUALLY, ISRAELI AIR STRIKES ON CERTAIN SYRIAN
MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE BEIRUT AREA WHICH ARE NOT
IN POPULATED AREAS, THE RISKS OF WIDER SYRIAN-ISRAELI
WAR, AS WELL AS WIDER ARAB INVOLVEMENT, WOULD BE HIGH.

EVEN IF SUCH SCENARIOS AS THE ABOVE EXAMPLE DO NOT
MATERIALIZE, THE HIGH VISIBILITY OF ISRAELI INVOLVEMENT
IN VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE LEBANON PROBLEM GIVES ADDED
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AMMUNITION TO THOSE IN THE ARAB WORLD SEEKING TO ESTABLISH
A NEW ARAB FRONT AND A NEW, UNIFIED APPROACH TO THE ARAB-
ISRAELI PROBLEM, IN WHICH SADAT WOULD ABANDON HIS
INITIATIVE FOR GOOD.

U.S. OBJECTIVE: TO EXAMINE WITH THE ISRAELIS HOW THESE
RISKS COULD BE LESSENED AND TO ASK HOW THE U.S. COULD
BE HELPFUL. WE WOULD WANT TO POINT OUT THAT WE HAVE MADE
FIRM REPRESENTATIONS TO SYRIA ABOUT ITS MASSIVE OVER-
REACTIONS AND THAT EXPRESSIONS OF INTERNATIONAL CONCERN
AND FROM CONGRESS MAY HAVE ALSO HAD A RESTRAINING EFFECT.

7. ISRAEL'S INTERNATIONAL IMAGE AND THE POSSIBILITY OF A
SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING.

ANALYSIS: AS WE HAVE SEEN IN HOUSE VOTE ON SYRIAN AID
PROGRAMS, ISRAELI ACTIONS IN SUPPORT OF THE CHRISTIANS
WILL PROBABLY GAIN IMPORTANT SYMPATHY IN THE U.S. AND
ELSEWHERE. AT SAME TIME, HOWEVER, PARTICULARLY IN SOUTH
LEBANON, THE ISRAELIS MAY INCREASINGLY BE VIEWED AS
OBSTRUCTIVE, DETERMINED WHATEVER THE CONSEQUENCES TO
OPPOSE THE EFFORTS OF A SOVEREIGN GOVERNMENT TO ESTABLISH
ITS AUTHORITY IN ITS OWN TERRITORY.

U.S. OBJECTIVES: TO MAKE CLEAR TO ISRAEL THAT WE WILL
DO OUR BEST TO FORESTALL SC ACTIONS BUT MAY NOT SUCCEED.
IN ANY EVENT, WALDHEIM MAY FEEL COMPELLED TO REPORT TO
THE SC.

MAKE CLEAR THAT THE U.S. WOULD DO ITS BEST TO HELP
PROTECT ISRAEL FROM UNWARRANTED CRITICISM BUT THAT THERE

ARE REALISTIC LIMITS BASED ON: (A) U.S. SPONSORSHIP OF
SC RES 425 AND THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF GOL AUTHORITY;
(B) THE KNOWN U.S. URGINGS THAT A LEBANON TROOP UNIT BE
SENT TO THE SOUTH; AND (C) THE TRADITIONAL U.S.-LEBANON
RELATIONSHIP AND U.S. SUPPORT FOR LEBANON'S TERRITORIAL
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INTEGRITY, SOVEREIGNTY, INDEPENDENCE AND UNITY. CHRISTOPHER

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